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Much of contemporary Anglo-American  Liberal political theory is still living under the shadow of 
Max Weber. In particular, it seems to accept the idea of disenchantment and has more recently 
discovered the problem value pluralism. Max Weber’s idea of the political still serves as an 
antidote to the prevalence in much of this kind of theory of the priority of the moral over the 
political. Unfortunately, Weber’s own theory is incomplete and needs to be supplemented.  
 
 
«If one accepts Weber’s premises, it is easy to be imprisoned by them».(1) 
It is a striking feature of much contemporary political theorising that it seems to be 
living in the shadow of Max Weber without, with a few notable exceptions, 
recognising or admitting that fact. The nature of the answer to the question of what 
is still alive in Weber’s thought will naturally depend upon the interest of the 
questioner. The main claim being made here is that Max Weber is still our 
contemporary with respect to the problem of value pluralism. He is also, or ought to 
be, our contemporary, with regard to his insistence upon the hard and tragic 
realities of political life. Much contemporary political theorising, especially in the 
Anglo-American world, has become divided between those who see it as being 
essentially normative and a branch of moral philosophy and those who insist on the 
autonomy of the political in such a way that denies the value of that kind of work.  
The problem of value pluralism has become a central topic in modern political and 
moral philosophy. This, in turn, is linked to the persistence of the idea of 
‘disenchantment’. The deeper the disenchantment the more intense the effects of 
value pluralism become.  
Most modern Anglo-American political theory is written in an analytical style that 
seems to discount any reference to and, hence, recognition of the presence of an 
implicit historical interpretation. Political philosophy, even in its most analytical 
form always presupposes or works within the framework of an implicit historical 
story.(2)  
The ‘historical story’ that pervades modern political thought is the account of 
‘disenchantment’ and the ‘war of gods and demons’ that Max Weber so forcefully 
 1
proposed. An interesting example of this can be found in the recognition of this fact 
by John Rawls in his account of his own version of ‘political liberalism’. Rawls 
argues that in «political philosophy the work of abstraction is set in motion by deep 
political conflicts».(3) These conflicts are deepened by the special nature of modern 
democratic political culture. This particular modern culture is ascribed to a 
historical context that differentiates the ancients from the moderns. In brief, Rawls 
advances a historical sketch that in pointing to the influence of the Reformation, the 
development of the modern state and modern science, closely resembles the 
Weberian account of disenchantment and its accompanying endemic value 
pluralism. Similarly, Michael Sandel in his critique of Rawls argues that this 
particular kind of liberalism presupposes ‘a vision of the moral universe’ as a place 
devoid of inherent meaning, a world “disenchanted” in Max Weber’s phrase, a 
world without an objective moral order.(4) Bernard Williams takes it as a given that 
in order to understand the legitimation of the modern state we must take account of 
the nature of modernity as described by social theorists such as Weber. In 
particular, he refers to pluralism and disenchantment.(5) 
Modern moral and political theory, or, at least the Anglo-American variety, has 
witnessed the emergence of a so-called ‘value –pluralist movement’. (6) What is 
value pluralism? Richard Flathman has stated that in significant respects ‘we are all 
pluralists’ in the modern world. He sees the core of pluralism in a broad sense as 
‘the recognition of a multiplicity of persons and groups…..A commitment to 
pluralism, however transitory or transitional, as a descriptive /analytic theory 
involves the belief that, here and now, such a multiplicity cannot be explained 
away’.(7) 
In his discussion of pluralism Flathman claims that there is no one who is not a 
pluralist to some degree although he admits that there are clearly many 
philosophers who argue that this view of pluralism is superficial and hides a deeper 
monistic universalism. Flathman discusses the work of William James, Hannah 
Arendt, Stuart Hampshire, and Michael Oakeshott as significant thinkers who have 
attempted to make sense of ‘the fact of pluralism’. 
Although the concept of pluralism can be used in this broad sense the most 
significant and puzzling aspect from the standpoint of political thought is that of 
value pluralism. To a large degree the modern idea of value pluralism restates in 
more analytical terms an idea that is clearly expressed in Weber’s work and, of 
course, earlier by Friedrich Nietzsche. This has been recognised in an interesting 
way, for example, by Charles Larmore. He points out that the problem of moral 
conflict and the fragmentation of moral value is at the centre of the work of moral 
philosophers such as Stuart Hampshire, Thomas Nagel, and Bernard Williams. (8) 
Larmore refers here to the ‘outstanding example of Max Weber who insisted upon 
the irreducible plurality of “value spheres”’. Indeed, Larmore expresses the central 
idea here very clearly when he states, in criticising Alasdair MacIntyre’s diagnosis 
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of the modern condition, that no «mature view of morality can fail to acknowledge 
the existence of rationally unsettlable moral conflicts. Pluralism is a truth, not only 
about conceptions of the good life, but also about that dimension of the good life 
that is morality itself».(9) It is important to note here that despite their reputation for 
clarity many of the political and moral philosophers who discuss pluralism do not 
always make it as clear as they might whether they are talking about a ‘fact’ or a 
theory. In other words, there is more at stake than the simple observation that there 
is as a contingent fact a plurality and diversity of beliefs, values, and doctrines. 
Furthermore, whether the ‘fact of pluralism’ supports any particular normative 
principles is itself a controversial question.(10) 
William Galston has conveniently summarised the main claims of the theory of value 
pluralism. The most important of these are that value pluralism ought not to be 
confused with relativism; that there is no available measure for the ranking of value 
and that there is no common measure nor summum bonum that is the good for all 
persons; that, nevertheless, there are some goods that are basic in the sense that 
they must form part of any reasonable human life; beyond this there exists a wide 
range of a legitimate diversity of goods, purposes, and cultures; and that value 
pluralism must be strongly contrasted with all forms of monism in the sense of 
theories that reduce all values to either a common measure or attempt to create a 
comprehensive hierarchy.(11) Galston states that the foundational text for the 
modern value pluralist trend in political and moral philosophy is Isaiah Berlin’s 
‘Two Concepts of Liberty’.(12) 
It is true to say that it was Berlin who was responsible more than anyone else for the 
emergence of this theme as a central preoccupation of modern Anglo-American 
political thought. However, Berlin’s voice was not the only voice and the distinct 
contribution of his colleague Stuart Hampshire ought not to be overlooked.(13) 
Berlin’s lecture ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, subsequently published as an essay, 
was, at first, read primarily as a provocative discussion of the distinction, held to be 
fundamental in modern European political thought, between ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’ liberty. Interest has slowly shifted away from the overworked and 
problematic nature of that distinction towards an examination of the thesis of value 
pluralism that underlies it. For example, in the concluding section of that essay with 
the title ‘The One and the Many’, Berlin criticises «the belief that somewhere, in the 
past or in the future, in divine revelation or in the mind of an individual thinker, in 
the pronouncements of history or science, or in the simple heart of an uncorrupted 
good man, there is a final solution. This ancient faith rests on the conviction that all 
the positive values in which men have believed must, in the end, be compatible, 
and perhaps even entail one another». (14) 
In many ways Berlin’s vision of pluralism is similar to that of Weber. However, 
although Berlin possessed an encyclopaedic knowledge of the history of European 
political thought it is strange that he makes very little reference to Weber’s writings. 
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One possible reason is that in the time when Berlin was formulating his ideas Weber 
was primarily classified by British intellectuals as a ‘founding father’ of the suspect 
new discipline of sociology. Berlin, although when he does mention Weber does 
exempt him from the general deficiencies of this new academic discipline, was still, 
nevertheless, influenced by this prejudice. In this respect, it is interesting to contrast 
Berlin with Raymond Aron, his contemporary, who shared many of his political 
views but who was deeply influenced by Weber. When pressed on this topic Berlin 
stated that when «I first formulated this idea, which is a long time ago, I’d never 
read a page of Weber. I had no idea that he said these things. People often ask me, 
but surely Weber was the first person to say this. I answer that I am sure he is, but 
I had no idea of it».(15) 
In Weber’s account the modern disenchanted world is a world that experiences an 
acute ‘polytheism of values’. As far as Weber was concerned «the different value 
systems of the world stand in conflict with one another…the different gods struggle 
with each other and will do for all time. It is just like in the ancient world, which 
was not yet disenchanted with its gods and demons, but in another sense. Just as 
Hellenic man sacrificed on this occasion to Aphrodite and on another to Apollo, and 
above all as everybody sacrificed to the gods of his city-things are still the same 
today, but disenchanted and divested of the mythical but inwardly genuine 
flexibility of those customs».(16) Furthermore, we must recognise that «the highest 
ideals, which move us most forcefully, are always formed only in struggle with other 
ideals which are just as sacred to others as ours are to us».(17) 
Max Weber clearly struggled with the problem of value pluralism. His vision of the 
‘war of the gods’ clearly justifies the label of ‘tragic pluralism’. He states clearly that 
«unsettled conflict, and therefore the necessity for constant compromises, dominates 
the sphere of values. No one knows how compromises should be made, unless a 
‘revealed’ religion will forcibly decide.» (18) The problem that arises here is how 
political institutions and actions can be made legitimate. In Weber’s opinion the fact 
that in the course of our lives we have to make compromises and that it is generally 
difficult to individuate particular values ought not to deflect us from the realisation 
that the at its deepest level the human world is characterised by an ‘irreconcilable 
death-struggle like that between “God” and “Devil”’.(19) 
 It has been argued that there we can discern two distinct versions of pluralism at 
work in much contemporary political theory. Raymond Geuss has made the claim 
that we can distinguish between a generally moderate and a more radical and, in a 
sense, ‘existentialist’, version of the thesis of value pluralism.(20) The more 
moderate version of pluralism is consistent with or, at least, is made to appear to be 
consistent with liberalism. A major difficulty arises if the claims of value pluralism 
are correct, that not only does it not offer support for liberalism but, rather, its main 
effect is to undermine it. Geuss argues that if we accept that ‘the conceptual 
framework of contemporary politics’ is ‘a highly complex abstract object’ then both 
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versions of pluralism are important. The problem, however, is that much theorising 
has either avoided the implications of the more radical version of value pluralism or 
has oscillated between these two versions in a generally unsatisfactory manner. 
Putting it crudely, one could argue that while Berlin generally represents the 
moderate version Max Weber, in contrast, represents the more radical and 
generally pessimistic view. 
If it is true that the theory of value pluralism is a thesis about values and not itself a 
political or ethical ideal it does remain true that value pluralism does have political 
implications.(21) The problem is to decide just what those implications are. Isaiah 
Berlin attempted to argue that pluralism implies liberalism. However, when 
challenged to explicate this relationship he moderated his claim. It would appear 
that, contrary to Berlin’s intentions a reasonable case can be made for the 
compatibility of value pluralism and political doctrines other than liberalism. John 
Kekes, for example, has argued that conservatism is the most plausible political 
response to value pluralism. Similarly, John Gray has forcibly argued for a 
conception of ‘agonistic liberalism’ as the best response to the reality of value 
pluralism. Gray’s argument, similar to that put forward by Sandel, is that if the 
thesis of pluralism is true it implies that liberal values are just one set of values 
among many. As such Liberal values can claim no special foundation or support 
from value pluralism. If the problem of value pluralism and its relationship to 
political doctrines such as Liberalism is such a central topic for contemporary 
political theorists is there anything to be learned from a consideration of Max 
Weber’s political thought? 
The question of the relationship between pluralism and liberalism in Weber’s 
thought runs up against one major problem. While it is fairly clear that Weber was 
committed to the truth of value pluralism to describe him as a ‘liberal’ in a 
straightforward sense is more controversial. Wilhelm Hennis has criticised the idea 
that Weber’s political ideas can be safely be defined as belonging to the liberal 
camp. The idea of Weber as ‘a liberal in despair’ popularised by Wofgang 
Mommsen among others gets no support here.(22) Hennis’s argument begins by 
pointing out that apart from two instances Weber never referred to himself using 
this term. On the other hand, it is also true that Weber, apart from one brief 
encounter, never allied himself with political forces that could be called ‘illiberal’. 
Weber wrote for a liberal newspaper, the Frankfurter Zeitung. However, these 
remarks presuppose an answer to the question of what we mean by Liberalism.  
Hennis defines Liberalism in curiously un-Weberian terms of an ‘ideal-typical 
essence’. The first central idea that Hennis identifies with the core of Liberalism is 
that of ‘abolition, the removal of limitations, setting free, combined with hope’.(23) 
The theme of ‘abolition’ refers primarily to the idea of economic liberalism 
understood as the freeing of economic life from state control in order to increase 
welfare. Hennis argues that there is no evidence for such a belief in Weber’s work. 
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As far as Weber was concerned the modern liberal form of economic life is simply 
our ‘fate’. It was not to be welcomed nor deplored in any kind of utopian sense.  
On the other hand, while it is true that Weber was a passionate defender of 
intellectual freedom and of the freedom of the press there is no sense in which his 
defence rested upon a belief that such freedoms would lead either towards a deeper 
understanding of the truth or towards greater discrimination and judgement. 
Modern science has the effect of deepening the disenchantment of the world. It 
does not deepen our understanding of it.  
Hennis points out that Weber’s appreciation of the development of the struggle for 
the rights of the individual against the state owed much to the work of his colleague 
Georg Jellinek who had shown how its origins were, to a large degree, to be found 
in an earlier religious and sectarian struggle. The key point here is that the 
Enlightenment ideal of a resolution of conflict by means of free rational debate that 
is central for most varieties of Liberalism was no longer, if it ever was, credible. 
This consideration alone separates Weber from the claims made by Jürgen 
Habermas on behalf of his version of discourse theory and the related claims made 
by various ‘deliberative democrats’.  
It is also clear that Weber’s thought is distanced from other familiar central Liberal 
ideas. In particular, Weber was deeply sceptical of all those attempts, typical of the 
nineteenth century, to produce theories of social development or of social evolution 
that were, in effect, theories of progress. Hennis is correct in pointing out that 
Weber was completely opposed to use of the ideas of ‘progress’ and ‘happiness’ as 
suitable concepts for social and political theory. However, while it might be said that 
these ideas were central for nineteenth century Liberal thought it is not so clear that 
they must be essential elements for all forms of Liberalism.  
In Hennis’s account Weber’s distance from Liberalism is grounded in his 
commitment to the ‘heteronomy of ideals’. Weber could not accept the idea, which 
Hennis sees as central for Liberalism, that ‘compromise, parliamentary discussion, 
or rational  discourse’ could serve as solutions to the problem created by the 
modern recognition of the depth of the persistence of plural and conflicting values. 
In Hennis’s view, the attempt to characterise Weber’s political ideas as ‘tragic’ or 
‘pessimistic’ Liberalism are a contradiction in terms. Deeply embedded in Weber’s 
view of the world is the belief that in all forms of social relations the most 
fundamental processes are those produced by the inevitable ‘struggle of man 
against man’. This alone would appear to separate Weber’s political thought from 
the basic ideas of Liberalism. Furthermore, the centrality of the question of rule 
(Herrschaft) would also seem to rule out a favourable response to the fundamental 
ideas of Liberalism. 
While all of these comments on Weber’s political thought are true a question still 
remains to be answered. If Weber’s political thought does not fit in to the 
conventional mould of Liberalism nor of any other doctrine where does it fit? One 
 6
answer is to say that this is not a problem and that there is nothing unusual in this. 
The thought of all great political thinkers transcends the political ideologies of their 
time. This is what, to a large degree, makes their thought important. Nevertheless, 
in whatever way we draw the line between political theory and partisan politics the 
question of the nature of Weber’s response to value pluralism requires further 
explication.  
Hennis himself admits that there is still something of a puzzle in Weber’s political 
stance which he accounts for in terms of his personality. Despite Weber’s scepticism 
towards the dominant and prevailing ideas of nineteenth century Liberalism he was 
deeply committed to the ideal of individual liberty. In other words, Weber is our 
contemporary insofar as he remained deeply committed to the ideal of individual 
liberty that is central for modern Liberalism but recognised, at the same time, that 
this political value can no longer gain the support that it has received in the past 
from such doctrines as natural law and natural rights. The liberty of the individual 
as a fact and as an ideal can only be understood as a product of a unique line of 
Western historical development. But in so doing Weber points to the fragility of this 
achievement. There is nothing inevitable about it nor ought we to be sanguine about 
its future prospects. It is in this light that we can appreciate Weber’s concerns about 
the future prospects of a ‘new serfdom’. Taking these considerations into account 
we can, as Hennis concedes, say that if Weber was a Liberal, then he was a 
‘strange kind of Liberal’. In this sense Weber can be compared with Tocqueville, 
also characterised as a Liberal of a ‘strange kind’. It can also be argued that 
Weber’s significance also rests upon the fact that what we find reflected in his work 
is the crisis of Liberalism itself. Weber’s political thought is the most significant 
example of the problem that Liberalism faces when «it becomes divorced from the 
egalitarian thrust of the natural rights tradition, and its universalist justification of 
tradition».(24) Weber’s Liberalism is then the Liberalism of a political thinker who 
also argued that it was the moral duty of the genuine political thinker to ‘swim 
against the current’.(25) 
 The argument being put forward here is that looking from the standpoint of 
contemporary political and moral theory Weber’s significance rests upon his 
recognition of the problem of value pluralism. Liberalism and pluralism are often 
seen as being closely related. Charles Larmore, for example, has pointed out that 
they are «both distinctively modern in that they have something to do with the 
metaphysical-religious disenchantment of the world»(26). However, it can be argued 
that pluralism understood as a doctrine about the nature of value must be 
distinguished from another idea that lies at the heart of modern Liberal thought. 
This is the idea of the inevitability of reasonable disagreement about values or the 
good. Larmore has argued that there is an important distinction to be drawn here. 
What some political philosophers, such as John Rawls, call pluralism is, in fact, the 
inability of reasonable people to agree upon what he calls ‘comprehensive 
 7
conceptions of the good’. What Isaiah Berlin, on the other hand, is talking about is 
itself a controversial doctrine about the nature of the good, one according to which 
objective value is ultimately not of a single kind but of many kinds. Doctrine and 
reasonable disagreement about doctrine can hardly be the same thing. Although it 
is important to be clear about these two aspects of pluralism it would appear that it 
is a mistake to argue that they can be separated in this manner. It is not at all clear 
that we can argue that moral disagreement is inevitable among reasonable persons 
without accepting some version of pluralism.(27) This seems to be right and also to 
be consistent with Max Weber’s views.  
Although, Weber clearly lacked the apparatus and terminology of contemporary 
political and moral theory it seems that the account that he offered of pluralism as a 
doctrine about plural and conflicting values is still of immense significance. In fact, 
it could be argued that it is superior in many ways to the accounts offered in the 
mainstream of modern Liberal political philosophy for many of the reasons that 
Wilhelm Hennis alluded to in his discussion of Weber’s Liberalism. In particular, it 
is Weber’s sense of the significance of ‘the political’. This is not meant in the 
friend/enemy sense of Carl Schmitt, although there is a connection between their 
ideas, but in a more general idea of the inadequacy of all attempts to reduce 
specifically political questions and problems to moral or technical questions that 
admit of a universal solution. In some ways Weber’s understanding of the nature of 
‘the political’ can be compared to Paul Ricoeur’s idea of ‘the political 
paradox’.(28)The basic idea here is that the political domain can be described in 
terms of an autonomy that is marked by possession of a unique rationality that can, 
at the same time, be a unique source of evil.  
The distinct character of Weber ‘s political thought rests upon its recognition that 
the modern, in reality post-Nietzschean and post-Marxist world, has created the 
challenge of a new reality that cannot rely upon traditional formulas. It is also true 
that «all ultimate questions without exception are touched by politics……».(29) At 
the heart of Weber’s vision of modern political reality is a view of value pluralism 
and of the permanence of political disagreement that can serve as an antidote to the 
abstractness and formalism of much contemporary political theorising. The problem 
that arises is one of defending the core values and institutions of Liberalism, 
individual liberty and its protective institutions, while at the same time recognising 
the demise of the traditional forms of Liberalism as a family of coherent 
philosophical and political doctrines. 
The value of Weber’s approach, if not of his actual institutional recommendations, 
rests upon the way in which his recognition of the challenge of pluralism in the 
modern world did not lead him to attempt to ‘bracket’ or marginalise the activity of 
politics. A steady stream of criticism has emerged in recent years of the tendency, it 
is argued, of much contemporary political theory and political philosophy to 
‘neutralise’ their account of the world of politics. For example, it has been claimed 
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that the dominant style of modern political philosophy is guilty of applying 
inappropriate theoretical models and the ‘supersession of the ostensible subject-
matter’ –politics. Most modern political philosophers, it is argued, are guilty of 
aiming for a ‘post-political order’.(30) One response to this perceived problem has 
been the revival of interest in the political thought of Carl Schmitt.(31) While it is 
true that there are deep connections linking the work of Schmitt and Weber it is a 
great mistake to ignore the deep differences that undoubtedly exist between them. 
The argument here is that Weber’s account of pluralism and disenchantment does 
still describe in a significant manner the contemporary political predicament 
certainly as it exists in Western liberal democratic states.  
The problem is just that: Weber’s political thought serves as a reliable guide and 
diagnosis but its weakness, it can be argued, lies in its inability to offer anything 
other than an incomplete image of a plebiscitary democracy as a possible 
institutional response to the pluralist predicament. This emphasis remains, however, 
too close to the surface of Weber’s thought. It is clear that Weber struggled during 
the aftermath of the First World War to produce an appropriate institutional 
response to the political crisis in Germany but it would be a mistake to interpret 
these proposals as the necessary outcome of his political thought. 
There is a response to the pluralist predicament that is consistent with the important 
insight that Weber has given us concerning the difficulty that the condition of 
modernity presents us in our attempts to think politically. The challenge, it is argued 
here, is to think politically in the context of a recognition of a pervasive value 
pluralism without recourse to an abstract formalism that too often seems to ignore 
the harsh and tragic realities of the political world without moving to the other 
extreme of an overly histrionic existentialism.  
If we agree that Weber presents us with an exceptionally intense example of an 
attempt to combine a deep understanding of the modern recognition of the 
challenge of pluralism with a defense of the value of ‘expressive liberty’ (32) then it 
is worth considering the response to this predicament initially put forward by Judith 
Shklar and recently developed by Bernard Williams. In her essay ‘The Liberalism 
of Fear’ Shklar identifies Liberalism as a political doctrine, not as a philosophy of 
life as it is often taken to be, that has one overriding aim. This is ‘to secure the 
political conditions that are necessary for the exercise of personal freedom’.(33)The 
‘Liberalism of Fear’ does not appeal to any of the traditional supports such as ideas 
of natural rights or of personal development. In essence this version of Liberalism 
simply recognises those unpleasant but inevitable features of the political world that 
arise from struggle, rule and ‘the extremity of institutionalized violence’ that Weber 
was so keen to highlight. In addition, however, because it recognises these dangers 
the Liberalism of Fear takes a stand against all forms of the abuse of public power. 
One important reason for this is that systematic fear makes freedom impossible. 
Shklar goes one step further, however, in arguing that as the theory of moral or 
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value pluralism is a controversial theory it ought not to be understood as a 
foundation for this form of Liberalism. It accepts with Weber and Berlin a general 
scepticism about the concept of a common good (summum bonum) but, in contrast, 
it does rely upon an idea of a summum malum. This is cruelty and the fear of 
cruelty. In contrast with the general tenor of Weber’s political ideas Shklar takes 
this recognition of the ‘fear of fear’ as implying a universal or cosmopolitan 
interpretation. Weber is generally understood to be highly suspicious of 
cosmopolitan claims in political thought and it is here that a genuine tension 
between his ideas and those of Shklar and others like her cannot be denied. It is 
here, perhaps, that we capture a sense of the deep influence of Nietzsche’s 
philosophy upon Weber. Nevertheless, as Bernard Williams has pointed out this 
particular version of Liberalism has the merit of not displacing politics in the sense 
of retaining the strong sense of political contest and conflict that is often absent in 
much contemporary Liberal academic political theorising.(34) This form of political 
theorising does not displace politics because it can only be understood by 
presupposing politics.  
In summary: Max Weber’s vision of the nature of the political in which value 
pluralism plays a central role is an indispensable component for modern theory. 
Unfortunately, Weber’s account is incomplete. In part, this is a consequence of his 
ambivalent attitude towards normative theorising. Nevertheless, Weber’s 
understanding of the problem of the political finds an echo in some recent versions 
of political philosophy which do not attempt to downplay the problems presented by 
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